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We analyze the characteristics of new businesses in the German ICT 
industry, distinguishing them based on their choice between two IPR 
regimes: open source software (OSS) or closed source software (CSS). 
The share of new firms with an OSS-based business model has 
increased considerably over the last several years. OSS-based firms 
tend to be smaller (in terms of staff and capital) and experience less 
shortages of capital. Only older cohorts of OSS-intensive start-ups had 
more difficulty than their CSS counterparts in convincing potential 
financiers of their viability, indicating that OSS business models are now 
well established. We find no evidence that the lower entry barriers for 
OSS firms are particularly attractive to start-ups with low human capital 
endowment or to necessity-motivated entrepreneurs. 
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1.  Institutional choice and characteristics of ICT firms 
Institutions can have many and various effects on start-up activity and 
entrepreneurship.
1
  The quality of many products is highly sensitive to the software the 
product contains. This is particularly true of the ICT sector where most 
goods and services are heavily based on software, which can be OSS 
or CSS, the latter also called “proprietary” software. CSS is based on 
the idea of exclusive intellectual property, protected by restrictive CSS 
licenses. Consequently, the user-customer receives CSS in the form of 
 Since institutions typically differ among regions or 
countries, a great deal of the empirical research on the effects of 
institutions compares regions or countries (Amoros, 2009; Burke and 
Fraser, 2007; Hall and Sobel, 2008; Nyström, 2008), which can lead to 
severe problems of controlling for many types of country- or region-
specific influences. However, comparative research within a country or 
region is possible only if there are different institutional (sub-)settings in 
a certain field. The information and communications technology (ICT) 
sector offers such an opportunity as here firms can choose between two 
different software-related IPR regimes: business models based on open 
source software (OSS) or those based on closed source software 
(CSS). In this case, firms not only act in the same country, region, and 
sector, but often directly compete in the same market. This paper 
analyzes the effects of OSS- versus CSS-based business models on 
the characteristics of new businesses in the ICT sector. Since the 
introduction of OSS has resulted in lower entry barriers and a reduction 
in the minimum efficient size for this type of business, our analysis also 
provides evidence concerning the effect of reduced entry barriers on the 
quality of start-ups set up under these conditions. Do the founders of 
OSS-based businesses comprise a higher share of necessity-motivated 
entrepreneurs? Do they have lower qualifications than founders of CSS-
based firms? 
                                            
1 See Acs et al. (2008), Foss and Foss (2006), Henrekson and Sanandaji (2010), 
Henrekson (2007), and Bosma and Fritsch (2010) for an overview. 
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a binary code and has no access to the source code—the human-
readable recipe of a software program.
2 OSS, to the contrary, is 
characterized by free access to the source code and is developed in a 
public, collaborative manner. The principle of openness is codified in the 
OSS license, which permits users to apply, change, and redistribute the 
software. This “new intellectual property paradigm” (Maurer and 
Scotchmer, 2006) implies different allocations of intellectual property 
rights (IPRs) and different modes of organization compared to CSS. 
High-quality OSS products, such as Linux, Apache, and the like, are 
developed by thousands of volunteers who often do not receive direct 
monetary reward. Moreover, an increasing number of profit-oriented 
firms, small and large, employ OSS-based business models and are 
active members of the OSS community. Since OSS is freely available 
and therefore cannot feasibly be sold, these business models are based 
on the idea of selling complementary products such as hardware (e.g., 
servers, cell phones), premium versions of the software, or different 
kinds of service, like maintenance.
3
Neither CSS- nor OSS-based business models necessarily imply 
that the firm develops software on its own. For example, firms may use 
readymade software to control their hardware devices, provide service 
for third-party code, or host a website using web server software. Some 
firms may enhance the software codes, for example, by offering 
 
                                            
2 Software programs use a programming language that results in a human-readable 
source code. To run a software program on a computer, this code must be 
transformed into a machine-readable binary code. Since the transformation of a binary 
code into a programming language would require immense effort, transferring only the 
binary code maintains the source code as a virtual secret and also prohibits changes 
to the program because such changes require access to the source code itself. 
3 Prominent examples of hardware devices that use Linux as embedded software are 
Amazon’s Kindle, Cisco’s MDS and Nexus data switches, Linksys’ WRT54G W-LAN 
router, numerous Motorola, Nokia, and Panasonic mobile phones, Philips’ LPC3180 
microcontroller, TomTom’s GPS navigation systems, and various LCD and plasma 
televisions produced by LG Panasonic, Samsung, and Sony. Another recent example 
of embedded OSS is the software stack Android. Acer, Barnes and Noble, Dell, HTC 
Corporation/Google, Lenovo, LG, Motorola, Samsung, and Sony Ericsson all 
manufacture and sell mobile devices that come preinstalled with Android. Red Hat, 
Novell’s SUSE, and other Linux distributors collect and optimize available OSS, 
bundle this with further CS (premium versions), and offer additional services, like 
support and maintenance. 
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customized versions, while others may develop entirely their own 
programs. We are interested in the whole set of such business models 
and focus on the differences between start-ups that use OSS and those 
that use CSS. Clearly, we need to control for the different kinds of 
business models because the business model also affects firm 
characteristics, for example, firms offering web service versus those 
selling hardware with installed software. 
  To date, research into the effects an OSS-based business model 
has on the firm’s properties and performance mainly focuses on OSS 
firms only and does not compare OSS firms with their CSS counterparts 
in order to identify the specific characteristics of OSS firms. The majority 
of literature describes various business models of OSS firms, why and 
how they are engaged in the OSS community, and whether such 
community participation has an impact on their economic success.
4
                                            
4 See, among others, Bonaccorsi et al. (2006), Dahlander and Magnusson (2006), 
Dahlander and Wallin (2006), Fosfuri et al. (2008), Harison and Cowan (2004), Rossi 
and Bonaccorsi (2006), Stam (2009), and West and Gallagher (2006). 
 The 
relationship between OSS and entrepreneurship is analyzed by Gruber 
and Henkel (2006), who focus on new ventures that apply embedded 
Linux. Based on information from personal interviews, the authors 
conclude that market entry barriers for new ventures are less relevant 
for OSS-based firms. Since the sample does not contain CSS-based 
firms, this analysis does not allow a comparison between the two 
institutional settings. To the best of our knowledge, there are only two 
studies that directly compare OSS- and CSS-based firms. Investigating 
a sample of 134 software solutions developed by small and medium-
sized Italian enterprises, Rossi Lamastra (2009) concludes that OSS 
solutions seem to be more innovative. Harison and Koski (2010) 
analyze how the characteristics of firms shape their OSS versus CSS 
decision for a sample of 170 Finish software companies. They 
distinguish between firms with no OSS (i.e., exclusively based on CSS) 
and firms with at least some use of OSS (either an OSS-CSS mix or 
exclusively OSS). Harison and Koski (2010) find that firms following an 
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OSS strategy are characterized by relatively well-qualified personnel as 
well as by a greater variety of services provided. According to their 
analysis, younger and smaller firms more often apply OSS strategies 
than do older ones. An analysis of the impact of the institutional choice 
between OSS and CSS on the decision to start a new business, 
however, has yet to be conducted. 
This paper analyzes the characteristics of young OSS- and CSS-
based ICT firms in Germany. Based on survey data, we investigate how 
the institutional choice between the two IPR regimes shapes the 
decision to set up a business. In the following, we first explain principal 
institutional differences between OSS and CSS (Section 2). Section 3 
provides an overview of the relationship between institutions and 
entrepreneurship based on a conceptual model. We then derive 
hypotheses about the effect of OSS and CSS regulations on the 
decision to start a business and on the characteristics of the entries 
(Section 4). Section 5 introduces the data; Section 6 reports the results 
of the empirical analysis. Finally, we discuss our findings and suggest 
some avenues for further research (Section 7). 
2.  OSS versus CSS: A difference in institutions 
Institutions such as legal rules generate incentive structures that shape 
human interaction. North (1994) distinguishes between formal 
institutions, such as rules, laws, constitutions, and the like, and informal 
institutions, such as common noncodified norms of behavior, 
conventions, self-imposed codes of conduct, and so forth. The key 
difference between OSS and CSS is that they are different kinds of 
“institutional arrangements” (Davis and North, 1971), distinguishable by 
their application of copyright law, which is codified in the software 
licenses. The different types of licenses define different IPRs and imply 
different governance structures regarding software development (for a 
more detailed exposition, see von Engelhardt, 2008). 
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  CSS is based on exclusive ownership of the software and its source 
code. Aside from cases like contract programming, CSS users do not 
have the right to change or further develop the source code (abusus). 
CSS licenses only transfer the right to use the software as it is (usus 
and usus fructus). Consequently, the source code is “closed” as 
customers receive only the machine readable binary code. CSS users 
have to pay license fees for using the software, while the source code 
remains with the developing firm. Hence, the exclusively owned source 
code is an asset of the developing firm. In contrast, OSS is based on 
“inclusive” ownership: the OSS license transfers the whole set of rights 
to anybody who wants the software, including the right to change the 
code (abusus). Therefore, OSS is characterized by free access to the 
source code so as to enable users to change and further develop the 
code and thus firms cannot exclusively own OSS code. However, OSS 
is not software without any property rights or restrictions. Many forms of 
OSS licenses contain restrictions intended to ensure that OSS cannot 
be turned into CSS. For example, the most popular type of OSS 
license, the GNU General Public License (GPL), states that any further 
developed software as well as any derived code must also be licensed 
as a whole under the GPL. 
  Typically, OSS is not developed by a single person or firm but by a 
multitude of community members. Such community-based OSS 
projects are open and permeable but are certainly not unstructured. The 
projects are governed by a mixture of formal and informal institutions. 
This implies, for example, that firms with OSS-based business models 
must comply with the community rules; otherwise, they risk that the 
community will cease cooperating with them.  
3.  Institutions and entrepreneurship 
The relationship between institutions and entrepreneurship can be 
explained with a simple conceptual model (Figure 1). The starting point 
of this conceptual model involves feasible entrepreneurial opportunities, 
that is, opportunities that are, in principle, open to anyone (for a more 
Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 049 6 
 
detailed exposition, see Bosma and Fritsch, 2010). The available 
entrepreneurial opportunities are in many respects shaped by the 
governing formal and informal institutions.
5 Examples of how formal 
institutions shape entrepreneurial opportunities include legal 
requirements for starting a business or labor market regulations. 
Informal institutions, such as modes of conduct, routines, or a certain 
culture (Freytag and Thurik, 2010; Nguyen et al., 2009), also influence 
how entrepreneurial opportunities are perceived and acted upon. The 
differences between OSS and CSS with respect to formal (e.g., types of 
licenses) and informal (e.g., “hacker” ethics) institutions thus determine 
differences in the entrepreneurial opportunities of OSS- versus CSS-
based business models. The licenses and the resulting IPR allocation 
determine the availability of the code and how this code can be used. 
For example, an OSS-based business model can be more flexible 
because the start-up firm has access to the source code and can thus 
change it (e.g., customize the software).
6
  Because the informal institutions—the unwritten rules—emerge 
through a network of interactions, these networks can be viewed as part 
of the informal institutions. The overlap between networks and informal 
 Furthermore, the informal 
institutions of the OSS community, for example, the culture of helping 
each other as well as the idea of “contributing back” (expected 
reciprocity), shape entrepreneurial opportunities. 
                                            
5 There is a pronounced interdependence between the formal and informal institutions, 
chiefly because formal institutions often emerge from informal institutions. However, 
the governing formal institutions feed back into the informal institutions by providing 
the legal framework for interaction, which, in turn, may lead to the further development 
of formal rules. The emergence of OSS is a good example of such a development. 
OSS emerged from dissatisfaction with the closed source principle. Based on the 
informal institutions of hacker ethics and a culture of making software freely available, 
MIT scientist Richard Stallman designed and introduced the GNU General Public 
License (GPL), currently the most popular type of open source license. With the GPL, 
Stallman invented a new concept of copyright-based ownership (the so-called copyleft 
principle). It was an act of institutional entrepreneurship that changed the level of 
institutionalization by transferring some cultural norms—i.e., informal institutions—into 
a formal institution, the GPL. 
6 It is, of course, also possible to customize a CSS code, but this requires a special 
license agreement with the original CSS developer and, probably, payment of license 
fees. In the case of OSS, the code can be further developed without such a special 
agreement. 
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institutions is particularly due to the fact that certain rules or a certain 
“culture” may be specific to a certain network and inapplicable to other 




















Figure 1: Institutions and entrepreneurship: A conceptual model 
  Taking advantage of an entrepreneurial opportunity depends, first, on 
the opportunity being recognized as such, as well as on the costs and 
benefits of starting a business compared to alternatives such as 
dependent employment, living on unemployment benefits, or obtaining 
an education, all of which can act to “filter” out the realization of some 
business opportunities. According to the model of occupational choice 
(Knight, 1921; Lucas, 1978; Kihlstrom and Laffont, 1979; Holmes and 
Schmitz, 1990), potential entrepreneurs compare the (pecuniary and 
nonpecuniary) benefits they anticipate receiving from employment with 
those they expect to accrue from starting a business. The opportunity 
costs of entrepreneurship are affected by: 
(a)  formal institutions, such as unemployment benefits or the tax 
system, as well as informal institutions, such as the social prestige 
of self-employment or family history; and 
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(b)  individual resources as well as by resources available in the 
network. 
Individual resources comprise all those input factors needed to start a 
business, including labor, human capital, financial capital, organizational 
capital, social capital, physical capital, knowledge, and technology. 
Individual resources also encompass personal characteristics that are 
at least partially innate, such as education, risk attitudes, motivations, 
and preferences. 
  A person’s network of relationships—his or her ego network—
represents the person’s organizational capital, that is, the ability to 
mobilize the resources of others in one’s own venture. Note that there is 
an important difference between the overall network and an actor’s 
individual ego network. Overall networks enable actors to connect their 
individual resources with the resources of others, thereby aggregating 
and transforming these resources into an aggregate resource stock 
available to all members of the network. This aggregate stock of 
resources influences how an individual member of the network will see 
and possibly pursue an entrepreneurial opportunity. The OSS 
“community” is a good example of this type of network as belonging to it 
reduces the amount of individual resources needed to start an own 
businesses in this sector. 
4.  CSS- versus OSS-based start-ups: Hypotheses 
ICT firms can choose between OSS- and CSS-based business models. 
However, since each type of business model does not exclude the 
other, that is, both can be used at the same time, in many cases the 
choice is really a question of the degree to which OSS and CSS are 
used by ICT start-ups. 
  The decision to adopt an OSS- or a CSS-based business model has 
implications for the individual resources needed to start up. CSS-based 
start-ups either have to pay license fees or develop their own software; 
OSS-based start-ups can use the code provided by the community and 
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moreover obtain support from the community in further development of 
the software code. This sort of support is mainly accessed by two 
channels: collaborative development of the software code and/or 
assistance via discussion forums. Freely available source code as well 
as OSS community support can considerably reduce the amount of 
resources, particularly as to personnel, needed to start a firm. Thus, in 
following an OSS-based strategy, a founder may be able to substitute 
network resources for individual resources, meaning that setting up an 
OSS-intensive start-up should require less personal resources than 
starting a new business based on CSS. Hence, we assume that: 
H I: OSS-based new businesses are smaller at inception than CSS-
based start-ups. 
This expected statistical relationship between OSS business models 
and start-up size raises the question of causality: Do founders choose 
OSS-based business concepts of necessity because they do not have 
sufficient resources to set up a CSS-based firm, or is the choice of an 
OSS-based concept primarily motivated by other reasons that are 
independent of resource requirements? With regard to capital, we can 
control for this issue to some degree based on information about 
whether a lack of capital was one of the main problems when starting 
the business. If we find that OSS founders do, indeed, experience more 
difficulty in obtaining capital than do the founders of CSS-based firms, it 
could be an indication that the lower capital requirements of an OSS-
based concept may have been a reason to favor this type of business 
model. If capital bottlenecks play no special role for OSS founders, 
however, then the smallness of OSS start-ups may be viewed as more 
of a result of, than a reason for, choosing OSS. Nevertheless, the 
insignificance of capital bottlenecks for OSS founders does not 
necessarily mean that such shortages are unimportant, since it could be 
that founders of OSS-based firms that report no such bottlenecks would 
have experienced them if they had chosen a CSS-based concept. We 
expect that: 
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H II:  OSS-intensive start-ups face capital bottlenecks to a lesser degree 
than CSS-based new businesses. 
  OSS-based ICT start-ups may have more difficulty convincing 
potential financiers of their future viability, for two reasons. First, since 
OSS-business models are relatively novel, they may be viewed with 
more skepticism by potential investors than would more conventional 
CSS-based concepts. In particular, potential financiers might expect that 
customers will only rarely accept (and thus purchase) OSS-based 
solutions. Second, financiers might assess OSS start-ups as more risky 
because the business model is not, or is very rarely, based on selling 
the software. Thus, the economic success of OSS start-ups relies to a 
much higher degree on complementary products and services than is 
the case for CSS start-ups. Moreover, OSS-based firms may be 
regarded as more risky because their success partly depends on future 
developments in the appropriate software community. A certain project 
may be split up (forking) or even die off due to a lack of further voluntary 
contributions. In other words: the differences between the formal and 
informal institutions of OSS versus CSS determine differences in 
entrepreneurial opportunities and result in higher risk for OSS-based 
business models. Potential financiers may thus be more hesitant to 
invest in OSS business models than in CSS-based ones. For these 
reasons, we expect that: 
H III: OSS-based start-ups have more difficulty convincing potential 
financiers of their future viability than do CSS-based new 
businesses. 
  As discussed above, starting an OSS-based business may require 
fewer individual resources than setting up a business based on CSS. 
Hence, the relatively low entry barriers for OSS-based businesses may 
attract founders with qualifications and experience of a quality that 
would be insufficient to set up a CSS-based firm (Fritsch and Schroeter, 
2009; Parker, 2009). If this is true, the lower entry barriers to starting an 
OSS-based business would lead to an increase in the number of ICT 
entries, but these additional entries would have a relatively low quality. 
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This in no way implies that all OSS-start-ups are of low quality, only that 
low-quality start-ups are more likely to be OSS-based than based on 
CSS. It therefore may be expected that start-ups with less experienced 
founders and less educated staff have a higher level of OSS usage.
7
H IV:   Founders and personnel of OSS-based start-ups have lower 
levels of qualification and experience than do those of CSS-
based new businesses. 
 
  Due to the lower entry barriers for OSS-based firms, we anticipate 
that: 
H V:   Founders of OSS firms are more likely to be necessity motivated 
than founders of CSS-based firms. 
OSS-based businesses have lowers barriers to entry, which makes it 
relatively easy to realize a business idea (take advantage of an 
opportunity) as well as to establish a firm out of necessity. The reason 
for expecting a greater number of necessity-motivated founders among 
the OSS firms is that necessity entrepreneurs tend to be relatively short 
of own resources and thus unable to start a venture in a field with 
relatively high entry barriers, such as CSS. In other words, opportunity 
entrepreneurs should be less deterred by high entry barriers than 
necessity-motivated founders. The results will provide evidence as to 
the degree to which lower entry barriers are conducive to an increase in 
the number of primarily necessity motivated start-ups. 
5.  Data 
Our data are based on a survey of founders of German ICT firms 
conducted in the autumn of 2009. In a first step, we sent an invitation by 
                                            
7   Hypothesis IV does not necessarily contradict Harison and Koski (2010), who 
found that established software firms with OSS-based business models have higher 
levels of human capital in terms of education. First, Harison and Koski (2010) focus on 
software firms, whereas we analyze firms in all parts of the ICT sector. Second, and 
more important, Harison and Koski (2010) study established firms, while we focus on 
start-ups. If, for example, start-ups with a low level of qualification exit the market 
rather quickly, meaning that those OSS firms that survive have relatively well-qualified 
personnel, there is not contradiction between our hypothesis and the results of 
Harison and Koski (2010). 
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post to about 6,000 firms
8
  The survey requested information about the firm in 2009 as well as at 
the time of its start-up. The questions about OSS versus CSS focused 
particularly on the business models applied and were intended to 
discover the degree to which OSS is a part of the end product sold to 
customers. We explicitly excluded aspects covering the use of freely 
available software such as OpenOffice for business correspondence 
and the like. The firm founders were asked to select from a list up to 
three business fields in which the firm was active when founded (see 
Table A1 in the Appendix). For each of these business fields, we then 
asked for usage of OSS
 asking them to participate in an online inquiry 
and containing an individual access key. We specifically required that 
the questions be answered by the founder or a member of the founding 
team. After about two weeks, we sent a reminder. As a result, more than 
700 founders of ICT firms filled out our online survey completely. As 
some of those firms did not sufficiently match the focus of our research, 
we ended up with a data set of usable answers from 680 founders, a 
response rate of more than 11 percent. 
9
                                            
8 The addresses of the ICT firms were selected from the heise IT-Markt, which is an 
online catalogue for German ICT firms run by the heise publishing company. Among 
other products, heise publishes the periodical c’t, a highly reputated IT journal, as well 
as the German version of MIT’s Technology Review. The homepage of heise is a well-
known web address for ICT issues, and with its heise news ticker the company runs 
one of the most successful (German) ICT news portals. The heise IT-Markt offers 
German ICT firms the opportunity to include their profile, i.e., their name, address, 
product portfolio, etc., in a freely available Internet database. Potential customers can 
search for ICT firms in this database using different search parameters (region, 
products, etc.). Starting at the end of March 2009, we collected names and postal 
addresses of firms operating in the industry subcategories of interest for of this study. 
After cleaning the data of duplicates and misleading entries, we ended up with 
addresses for 15,300 firms. From this database, we drew a random sample of 6,000 
firms. 
 at the time of start-up. Furthermore, we asked 
for the year of start-up, the number of employees at start-up, and 
important problems faced when setting up the firm. Table A1 in the 
Appendix provides definitions of the variables from the survey that we 
use in this analysis. 
9 Regarding OSS, we asked whether the software used in the respective business 
field at time of founding was OSS. Possible answers were “yes, exclusively,” “mainly,” 
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Figure 2:  Institutional change as institutional choice: OSS and CSS 
use in German ICT start-ups, 1983–2008 
 
  Since the emergence of OSS in 1984,
10
                                                                                                                   
“about 50%,” “a small extent,” “no (nearly) never,” and “I do not want to answer this 
question.” 
 the number of firms engaged 
in the OSS business has increased steadily. The resultant institutional 
change in the ICT sector is reflected in our survey data. In the period 
1984–2008, the share of start-ups based entirely on CSS decreased 
considerably (Figure 2). Since the late 1980s, there is a rising share of 
start-ups for whom at least 50 percent of their business is based on 
OSS. That the share of start-ups completely based on OSS never 
exceeds 16 percent indicates that the vast majority of new firms favor a 
strategy that is a mixture of OSS and CSS. Thus, coexisting within the 
10 The year 1984 can be regarded as the initial year for what we now call “open source 
software” since software development of the General Public License (GNU) project 
began in January 1984. 
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market are mainly OSS-based firms, mainly CSS-based firms, and firms 
that combine a use of both OSS and CSS. The share of start-ups with 
hybrid strategies (i.e., business models based on a mix of OSS and 
CSS) increased over the years, reaching a maximum of 68.42 percent 
in 2008. 
  Since all our information on start-ups comes from firms that were in 
business at the time of the survey, there is undoubtedly some survivor 
bias to the data, that is, start-ups that exited the market previous to our 
survey are not included. Examining the number of firms ordered by their 
reported year of founding illustrates this bias. Starting with 1984, the 
number of firms tends to increase, reaching its peak in 2004. 
Comparing these numbers with general data about newly founded ICT 
businesses from the start-up panels of the Centre for European 
Economic Research (ZEW Mannheim)
11
6.  Who chooses OSS for start up? 
 shows that for earlier years the 
trend in our data (number of start-ups) does not match the development 
of ICT foundings reported in the ZEW data. This discrepancy is clearly 
due to the fact that our data include survivors only. In addition, our data 
show a drop in the number of start-ups between 2007 and 2008, which 
does not reflect the general trend of the ZEW data. This suggests an 
underrepresentation of 2008 start-ups in our sample, which can be 
explained by a time lag for being included in the heise database, the 
source of addresses for our survey. 
Our goal is to explain the intensity of OSS use in various fields of 
business by looking at the individual characteristics of the start-up firms. 
As the dependent variable is of an ordinal character—ranging from 
always OSS (4) to never OSS (0) (see Table A1)—we applied ordered 
logit analysis (for details, see Greene, 2008). To avoid survivor bias, we 
estimate the models for the relatively recent cohorts of 2005 to 2008, 
                                            
11 We are indebted to the Centre of European Economic Research (ZEW Mannheim) 
for providing these data. 
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but also for 2003 to 2006.
12 Since our sample of start-ups in 2008 may 
be biased due to relatively incomplete coverage of that specific vintage, 
we also ran all models for the 2005–2007 period. Descriptive statistics 
and correlations between variables are shown in Tables A2 and A3 in 
the Appendix. Testing for the parallel regression (proportional odds) 
assumption, we perform a Brant test for each of our models. 
Furthermore, we include two control dummies for the broad business 
fields of “further development of software” and “new media and 
Internet.” The first dummy assumes a value of 1 if the founder reported 
that own software developments were part of the product sold.
13 The 
second dummy has the value 1 if “web hosting,” “web design and web 
service,” or “services of new media agencies and related” was a 
business field at time of start up.
14
  The results for the more recent cohorts (2005–2008), which should 
not be affected by a strong survivor bias, clearly indicate that OSS-
based start-ups tend to be smaller in terms of personnel and in terms of 
capital invested (Table 1), confirming Hypothesis I. We also find that 
OSS start-ups are less constrained by the availability of capital than are 
CSS start-ups. Because of the considerable correlation between the 
“lack of capital” and the “convince financiers” variables, the model is 
also run without one of these variables (Models (2) and (3)) but the 
results remained largely unchanged. Due to some correlation between 
“education” and “experience,” Model (4) is run without the “education” 
variable, while in Model (5) the “experience” variable is omitted. We find 
that OSS start-ups are not characterized by a less well-qualified initial 
personnel than are CSS start-ups. On the contrary, there is indication 
that the initial personnel for OSS start-ups are significantly more highly  
 
                                            
12 The two periods overlap by one year so as to have a sufficient number of 
observations. 
13 This means that either “selling own hardware with own developments of software,” 
“selling third-party hardware with own developments of software,” or “selling own 
developments of software” were chosen as a business field in the survey. 
14 We also ran all models with the complete set of detailed business field dummies 
(see Table A1 in the Appendix) and found very similar results. For these models, 
however, the Brant test could not be computed. 
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Table 1:  Characteristics of software start-ups (2005 to 2008) according 
to use of OSS in their business model (ordered logit analysis) 
 
Dependent Variable: OSS 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 






  (0.028)  (0.070)  (0.027)  (0.065)  (0.032) 
           










  (0.000)  (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
           
Lack of capital  -0.874




  (0.041)    (0.019)  (0.039)  (0.039) 
           
Convince 
financiers 
-0.0947  -0.570    0.00481  -0.287 
(0.861)  (0.284)    (0.993)  (0.605) 
           
Education  0.568  0.574  0.559    0.617
* 
  (0.117)  (0.121)  (0.122)    (0.091) 
           
Experience  0.854  0.911  0.878  0.918
*   
  (0.128)  (0.120)  (0.111)  (0.088)   
           
Necessity 
motivation 
-0.379  -0.352  -0.370  -0.286  -0.425 
(0.333)  (0.364)  (0.340)  (0.444)  (0.282) 
           
Age of firm  0.0859  0.0836  0.0850  0.0702  0.0799 
  (0.585)  (0.610)  (0.591)  (0.651)  (0.616) 
           








(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 










(0.011)  (0.024)  (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.014) 
cut1           
Constant  0.0923  0.475  0.110  -0.00585  -0.740 
  (0.927)  (0.639)  (0.911)  (0.995)  (0.383) 
cut2           
Constant  1.195  1.552  1.211  1.089  0.342 
  (0.235)  (0.124)  (0.222)  (0.269)  (0.685) 





*  1.208 
  (0.046)  (0.020)  (0.042)  (0.051)  (0.166) 







  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.004) 
Number of 
observations 
135  135  135  135  135 
Pseudo R
2  0.169  0.157  0.169  0.163  0.163 
df_m  10  9  9  9  9 
probchi2  5.71e-09  8.16e-10  1.99e-09  4.05e-09  2.08e-09 
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qualified than the CSS personnel, particularly in the analyses of the 
2005–2007 (Table A4) and 2003–2006 cohorts (Table A5). Model (4) 
indicates that OSS founders are also more likely to have had some 
experience in the software sector before start up. There is no 
statistically significant evidence that OSS start-ups are more necessity 
motivated than are new CSS-based firms. 
  The highly significant coefficient for the business field dummy “new 
media and Internet” indicates that start-ups in this area have a strong 
propensity to use OSS, which is plausible since the output of some of 
the most successful OSS projects, such as the Lamp stack software for 
running web servers, is widely used in the Internet economy.
15 
Regressions not including the start-ups of the “new media and Internet” 
group led to very similar results compared to regressions that did 
include these start-ups.
16
  Excluding firms started in 2008 because they may represent a biased 
selection of all start-ups that year reveals results very similar to those 
found for the new businesses of the 2005–2008 period (Table A4 in the 
Appendix), one main difference being that now education level has a 
positive impact on OSS intensity. Running the models for the older start-
up cohorts of 2003–2006 largely confirms the results, with, in this case, 
one difference being that the impact of the staff variable is no longer 
statistically significant and there is an age effect instead. Obviously, the 
surviving OSS-based start-ups of this period did not begin with 
significantly fewer personnel than their OSS counterparts, but they were 
 
                                            
15 Most web servers are driven by an OSS “Lamp Stack” software suite that includes a 
Linux operating system, Apache web server, MySQL database, and PHP/Perl/Python 
programming languages. Development is supported by corporations such as Novell, 
IBM, Oracle, and Borland, who then bundle Lamp with their proprietary hardware and 
software. Small web developers also use Lamp in their businesses and contribute-
code to the project. 
16 We also checked for a “hardware effect” in the sense that firms that sell hardware 
have a significantly different attitude toward OSS than do software firms. Hence, we 
excluded the new media and Internet start-ups and ran the models with a 
hardware/software dummy as the business field variable. This variable was never 
statistically significant and the results for the other variables remained largely 
unchanged. Also, running the regressions for software start-ups only did not lead to 
any significant change in the results. 
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significantly smaller in terms of capital requirements. It is remarkable 
that the older OSS-based start-ups report that convincing investors of 
their viability was a problem. This may be a reflection of the skepticism 
with which OSS-based start-ups were viewed at that time, particularly if 
one keeps in mind that our data are affected by a survivor bias so that 
our sample contains only those businesses proven to be viable for a 
number of years. 
  In all start-up cohorts—except the two most recent (2005–2008 and 
2005–2007)—we find that the control variable for the age of a firm is 
significantly related to the use of OSS at the time of start up. This 
means that older firms show a lower probability of having been an OSS-
based start-up than more recently founded businesses. There are two 
possible interpretations of this finding. First, as shown in Figure 2, OSS 
was less common in earlier periods, only becoming more popular in 
recent years. Second, if it is the case that OSS start-ups suffer a higher 
chance of failure than CSS start-ups, this statistical relationship may be 
a result of a survivor bias in the data. 
  We conclude that the results of our analyses support Hypothesis I, 
which states that smaller start-ups—in terms of staff and capital—are 
more likely to be OSS intensive than are larger ones. Supporting 
Hypothesis II, we find that OSS-intensive start-ups report a lesser 
degree of capital shortage, which may be seen as an indication that the 
main reason for choosing an OSS-based business model is not that the 
firms cannot afford CSS. In short, generally, OSS is not a strategy of the 
weak, but an efficient way of realizing an entrepreneurial opportunity. A 
statistically significant relationship between problems of convincing 
potential financiers and OSS intensity (Hypothesis III) is found only for 
the 2003–2006 cohorts, suggesting that the problems of convincing 
financiers were due to a relative unfamiliarity with and thus non-
acceptance of this fairly new type of business model during those years. 
When our indicators for experience and education are statistically 
significant, they have a positive sign, meaning that Hypothesis IV, 
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stating that founders of OSS firms have lower levels of education and 
experience, is rejected. According to our data, OSS instead seems to 
attract relatively highly qualified entrepreneurs. We find no indication in 
our data that OSS is particularly attractive to necessity-based start-ups; 
thus, Hypothesis V is rejected. 
7.  Summary and outlook 
We find evidence that OSS-based business models enable firms to be 
smaller in terms of staff and capital so that they tend to experience 
capital shortages to a lesser degree than new businesses based on 
CSS. The disadvantage of finding it difficult to convince financiers to 
invest in the firm is found only for older cohorts and does not appear to 
apply to more recently founded firms. The rising share of OSS-intensive 
start-ups over time indicates that this business concept is attractive to 
entrepreneurs, and not necessarily, or even, to just those of low 
qualifications or who are starting a firm out of necessity. Indeed, we find 
some evidence that founders of OSS-based businesses have a 
relatively high level of both experience and education. Taken together, 
our results suggest that the lower entry barriers for OSS-based 
business as compared to CSS appear to have led to an increase of this 
type of business in the ICT sector, resulting in intensified competition. 
  Our results show a clear, but complex, effect of institutions—
here, the IPR regime—on the characteristics of market entry. At least in 
the case of OSS start-ups we cannot find evidence that the lower 
hurdles for market entry have led to more necessity-motivated 
entrepreneurship and/or lower average quality of start-ups in terms of 
qualification and experience. According to our results, the new IPR 
regime has opened up new opportunities for entrepreneurship that are 
mainly seized by well-qualified founders, many of whom engage in a 
mixed strategy of using both OSS and CSS. It is no doubt true that 
lower entry barriers have allowed a number of low-quality and 
necessity-motivated firms into the market, but, on average, OSS start-
ups do not encompass more necessity-motivated firms than do CSS 
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start-ups and their founders tend to be better qualified than those who 
start CSS-based firms. 
Future work should analyze the effects of institutional innovation in 
greater detail. An interesting avenue to explore would be how these two 
business models (OSS and CSS) evolve over time. Do firms that start 
with a high share of OSS switch to more CSS over time? Do mainly 
CSS-based firms tend to increase their share of OSS as they become 
more established in the market? What makes these types of business 
models successful? Another intriguing issue is the effect OSS-based 
business has on the innovative performance of markets. Is the high 
degree of labor division in OSS development and the openness of the 
OSS community conducive to innovation? If yes, what kind of 
innovation—incremental, radical, or both? Or, more generally, if the 
OSS regime makes the ICT sector more entrepreneurial, how does this 
affect the market? The ICT sector, with its two coexisting IPR regimes, 
provides a good opportunity for a better understanding generally of the 
relationships between institutions, entrepreneurship, and markets. 
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Table A1: Definition of variables 
 
Variable  Coding  Definition 
OSS  ordinal  The dependent variable. Intensity of OSS usage in the respective business field, 
at time of start up. The answering categories and the corresponding values are: 4 
= “Yes, exclusively”; 3 = “Mainly”; 2 = “About 50%”; 1 = “To a small extent”; 0 = 
“No (nearly) never.” 
Size (staff)  cardinal  Number of full positions—including the founders. We asked participants to 
convert number of employed people in full positions (e.g., one founder and a 
secretary with a 50% position makes 1.5 positions). 
Size (capital)  cardinal  Sum of real capital and financial capital.  
Lack of capital  binary  1 if founders marked “Lack of own capital” as one of the start-up problems they 
faced (permitted to mark more than one). 
Convince financiers  binary  1 if founders marked “Difficulties in convincing potential financiers regarding the 
business concept” as one of the start-up problems they faced (permitted to mark 
more than one). 
Education  binary  1 if there was at least one person in the firm with a university diploma or other 
corresponding level of education (at time of start up). 
Experience  binary  1 if at least one of the founders had experience in the sector.  
Necessity motivation  binary  1 if start-up was necessity based. Q: “Did you found the firm in order to realize a 
business idea or because there was no better alternative to generate income?” 
Answer categories are “To realize business idea”; “There was no alternative way 
to generate income” (=necessity); “Because of both reasons”; “Other reasons, 
namely ….” 
Controls     
Age of firm  cardinal  2010 minus the year of start-up. Question: “When did you start your business 
(year of first turnover)?” 
New media and 
Internet 




binary  1 if “selfHW_furthSW” or “extHW_furthSW” or “furthSW” is 1 (see list below). 
 
List of disaggregated controls for business fields: 
Web hosting  binary  1 if “web hosting” is a start-up business field. 
Web design/service  binary  1 if “web design and web service” is a start-up business field. 
New media agency  binary  1 if “services of (new media) agencies and related” is a start-up business field. 
selfHW_extSW  binary  1 if “selling own hardware with third-party software” is a start-up business field. 
selfHW_furthSW  binary  1 if “selling own hardware with further-developed software” is a start-up business 
field. 
selfHW_selfSW  binary  1 if “selling own hardware with self-developed software” is a start-up business 
field. 
extHW_extSW  binary  1 if “selling third-party hardware with third-party software” is a start-up business 
field. 
extHW_furthSW  binary  1 if “selling third-party hardware with further-developed software” is a start-up 
business field. 
extHW_selfSW  binary  1 if “selling third-party hardware with self-developed software” is a start-up 
business field. 
extSW  binary  1 if “selling third-party software” is a start-up business field. 
furthSW  binary  1 if “selling further-developed software” is a start-up business field. 
selfSW  binary  1 if “selling self-developed software” is a start-up business field. 
Service_othSW  binary  1 if “service for software bought from a third-party” is a start-up business field.  
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Table A2: Descriptive statistics 
 
Period 2005–2008  




OSS  1.551    0  4  1.434  198 
Size (staff)  1.617    0.25  11  1.142  198 
Size (capital*)  1.218    0  8  1.717  135 
Lack of capital  0.369    0  1  0.484  198 
Convince 
financiers 
0.207    0  1  0.406  198 
Education  0.581    0  1  0.495  198 
Experience  0.903    0  1  0.297  196 
Necessity 
motivation 
0.510    0  1  0.501  198 
Age of firm  4.051    2  5  1.001  198 
New media and 
Internet 
0.429    0  1  0.496  198 
Further develop-
ment of software 








OSS  1.522    0  4  1.452  182 
Size (staff)  1.644    0.25  11  1.176  182 
Size (capital*)  1.275    0  8  1.784  123 
Lack of capital  0.385    0  1  0.488  182 
Convince 
financiers 
0.203    0  1  0.404  182 
Education  0.566    0  1  0.497  182 
Experience  0.911    0  1  0.285  180 
Necessity 
motivation 
0.516    0  1  0.501  182 
Age of firm  4.23    3  5  0.829  182 
New media and 
Internet 
0.423    0  1  0.495  182 
Further develop-
ment of software 
0.077    0  1  0.267  182 
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2003–2006 




OSS  1.365    0  4  1.430  343 
Size (staff)  1.507    0.2  11  1.072  343 
Size (capital*)  1.185    0  8  1.615  260 
Lack of capital  0.338    0  1  0.474  343 
Convince 
financiers 
0.184    0  1  0.388  343 
Education  0.636    0  1  0.482  343 
Experience  0.921    0  1  0.270  341 
Necessity  0.397    0  1  0.490  343 
Age of firm  5.743    4  7  1.017  343 
New media and 
Internet 
.388    0  1  0.488   
Further develop-
ment of software 
.0875    0  1  0.283   
*  Capital is in 10,000 EUR. 
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Table A3:  Spearman rank correlations between variables (2005–2008) 
















                   
Size (staff)  1.000                  
Size (capital)  0.173*  1.000                
Lack of capital  0.030  -0.023  1.000              
Convince 
financiers 
0.215*  0.115  0.385*  1.000            
Education  0.237*  0.167*  -0.025  0.111  1.000          
Experience  0.005  0.029  -0.185*  -0.227*  0.109  1.000        
Necessity 
motivation 
0.144*  0.141  -0.081  -0.036  0.097  0.003  1.000      
Age of firm  -0.132  -0.018  -0.012  0.029  0.023  -0.003  0.047  1.000    
New media & 
Internet 
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Table A4: Characteristics of software start-ups (2005 to 2007) according 
to use of OSS in their business model (ordered logit analysis) 
 
Dependent Variable: OSS 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
           






  (0.036)  (0.089)  (0.035)  (0.097)  (0.042) 
           






  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000) 
           
Lack of capital  -0.813




  (0.070)    (0.040)  (0.078)  (0.071) 
           
Convince financiers  -0.0966  -0.538    -0.0550  -0.175 
  (0.865)  (0.334)    (0.923)  (0.760) 




*    0.767
** 
  (0.055)  (0.077)  (0.056)    (0.044) 
           
Experience  0.598  0.612  0.612  0.723   
  (0.328)  (0.320)  (0.315)  (0.202)   
           
Necessity motivation  -0.251  -0.183  -0.242  -0.147  -0.255 
  (0.546)  (0.659)  (0.556)  (0.715)  (0.547) 
           
Age of firm  -0.0299  0.0548  -0.0370  0.0488  -0.0661 
  (0.907)  (0.828)  (0.884)  (0.850)  (0.792) 
           






  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
           








  (0.030)  (0.059)  (0.029)  (0.028)  (0.026) 
cut1           
Constant  -0.512  0.240  -0.530  -0.126  -1.218 
  (0.743)  (0.870)  (0.733)  (0.935)  (0.369) 
cut2           
Constant  0.549  1.287  0.531  0.933  -0.167 
  (0.728)  (0.383)  (0.735)  (0.550)  (0.903) 
cut3           
Constant  1.258  1.978  1.241  1.629  0.536 
  (0.429)  (0.187)  (0.433)  (0.296)  (0.698) 





**  2.219 
  (0.072)  (0.022)  (0.073)  (0.043)  (0.121) 
Number of observations  123  123  123  123  123 
Pseudo R
2  0.164  0.153  0.164  0.154  0.161 
df_m  10  9  9  9  9 
probchi2  1.98e-08  6.65e-09  7.71e-09  6.85e-08  1.36e-08 
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Table A5: Characteristics of software start-ups (2003 to 2006) according 
to use of OSS in their business model (ordered logit analysis) 
 
Dependent Variable: OSS 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
           
Size (staff)  -0.0705  -0.0465  -0.0236  -0.0311  -0.0705 
  (0.565)  (0.691)  (0.834)  (0.804)  (0.565) 
           






  (0.012)  (0.003)  (0.006)  (0.018)  (0.012) 
           
Lack of capital  -0.598
*    -0.284  -0.641
**  -0.598
* 
  (0.057)    (0.304)  (0.033)  (0.056) 
           
Convince financiers  0.787
**  0.457    0.852
**  0.787
** 
  (0.026)  (0.122)    (0.014)  (0.026) 




**    0.576
** 
  (0.024)  (0.017)  (0.013)    (0.024) 
           
Experience  0.00242  0.0583  -0.0401  0.151   
  (0.995)  (0.887)  (0.920)  (0.699)   
           
Necessity motivation  0.301  0.335  0.292  0.337  0.301 
  (0.235)  (0.181)  (0.256)  (0.186)  (0.231) 
           






  (0.006)  (0.009)  (0.005)  (0.016)  (0.005) 
           






  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
           








  (0.024)  (0.031)  (0.024)  (0.016)  (0.023) 







  (0.041)  (0.090)  (0.041)  (0.075)  (0.034) 
cut2           
Constant  -0.765  -0.344  -0.749  -0.517  -0.767 
  (0.361)  (0.650)  (0.364)  (0.526)  (0.341) 
cut3           
Constant  -0.243  0.176  -0.236  -
0.00345 
-0.244 
  (0.771)  (0.816)  (0.775)  (0.997)  (0.761) 
cut4           
Constant  1.064  1.472
*  1.056  1.279  1.063 
  (0.198)  (0.050)  (0.197)  (0.115)  (0.183) 
Number of observations  260  260  260  260  260 
Pseudo R
2  0.075  0.069  0.068  0.068  0.075 
df_m  10  9  9  9  9 
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